Beer advertising is a topic that has frequently attracted the attention of industrial organization economists. This update reviews major events, data trends, and research for each of three issues: (1) the importance of advertising and product differentiation for structural change in the brewing industry; (2) the manner and extent to which brewers can strategically alter market shares using advertising; and (3) the social costs of beer advertising and marketing, including advertising bans, targeting of underage youth, and recent changes in the three-tier system of alcohol distribution. Major legal decisions pertaining to commercial speech and other regulations also are discussed.
several existing and emerging concerns, including new research results on possible targeting of adolescents in magazine advertising. Legal and regulatory issues related to the First and Twenty-First Amendments are discussed. Overall, the paper attempts to provide the reader with a timely update and foundation for future research.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section II provides an overview of beer advertising and marketing for the period . This section sets the stage for the rest of the paper by reviewing major trends, events, and recent competitive issues. Section III examines market-wide trends in beer consumption, advertising, and advertising intensity as well as sales and advertising by the three leading brewers. The relationship of advertising to market concentration is summarized and discussed. Section IV focuses on product differentiation, including sales and advertising by product category and leading brewers. I also examine changes in sales of the top 10 brands of beer. Research on strategic rivalry is summarized and discussed in this section. Section V examines the possible role of beer advertising as a contributor to social costs. Specific issues discussed include the legal setting for advertising bans provided by Supreme Court decisions; possible effects of advertising on total beer consumption; targeting of adolescents by beer advertisers in magazines; and threats to the three-tier distribution system posed by internet marketers, direct shipments of beer and wine, and mass-market retailers. Section VI contains the conclusions.
II. Beer Advertising Overview, 1975-2003
In 1970, the Miller Brewing Company was acquired by the conglomerate Philip Morris. Miller, in 1972, purchased the brand names of Meister Brau, a defunct Chicago brewer, including its low-calorie Lite brand. Miller reconstituted the formula and in 1973 put its version of Lite into test markets Rosenbaum 1987; Scherer 1996) 1 Definitions for specialty-craft brewers and the other beer categories used here are given in the Beer Handbook (2004, p. 47) . The leading brewers entered the craft category by creating semiautonomous subunits or subsidiaries (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000) , including Coors' Unibev Division (Blue Moon, Killian's); Miller's American Specialty Craft Brewing (Weinhard, Leinenkugel, Red Dog); and Anheuser-Busch's Specialty Brewing Group (Bare Knuckle, Elk Mountain, Killarney, Muenchener, Red Wolf, World Select, Ziegen). Table 1 Despite the success of light beer and the dominance of the top three brewers, Table 1 highlights three areas where new competition has prospered. First, by 1996, the U.S. had more than 1,000 specialty brewers, microbrewers, and brewpubs in operation (collectively specialty-craft brewers), and this number has grown to more than 1,400 (Beer Handbook 2004) . Most specialty-craft beers sell at super-premium prices and many are not pilsner-style beers, suggesting that the consumer can easily substitute or "tradeup" along a price-quality locus.
1 Second, beer imports grew from only 1.1% of the market in 1975 to 11% in 2001. Many importers and specialty brewers abstain from heavy national advertising, but this is not always true. Advertising outlays for Corona Extra, Heineken, and Samuel Adams are above the average spending per case. Third, Table 1 illustrates how rivalry among the industry leaders spilled over to the market for flavored malt beverages (FMBs). This trend was fueled in part by the 1991 federal tax hike on beverage alcohol, which shifted output of coolers away from more-heavily taxed wines. While
FMBs are not beers, their marketing reflects consumer tastes for lighter beverages and the possibility that FMBs might be the next runaway product category. However, under a proposed federal regulation issued by the Treasury Department's, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, a product could be classified as a malt beverage only if less than 0.5% of its alcohol content is derived from flavor concentrates (68 Federal Register 14291, March 24, 2003 
III. Beer Advertising and Structural Change
As detailed by Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) , the transformation of the beer industry occurred in several stages. First, during the period 1950-1964, an intense advertising rivalry took place among the top three brewers: Anheuser-Busch, Pabst, and Schlitz. These firms successfully exploited the new medium of television and the economies of scale associated with national advertising and distribution.
The number of brewers fell from 404 in 1947 to 150 in 1963 (Elzinga 2001) . The second period lasted from 1965 to 1974, and was marked by a lower level of advertising intensity.
2 However, the number of brewers continued to decline to 57 in 1974. Structural change during this period was marked by increased size of individual plants and multi-plant operations by the industry leaders (Scherer 1996 
Data Trends for Advertising Levels and Intensity
Given these dramatic structural changes, the importance of advertising has been debated on several fronts. I first provide a summary of data trends and then discuss past and present research. (Brewers Digest 1990) , and illustrates the fact that advertising in a "mature" industry primarily affects brand shares (Nelson 1997 . It also may reflect a tendency by affluent consumers to trade-up to higher-priced beers, which is an under-researched issue (see Berggren and Sutton 1999; Treno et al. 1993) . Table 2 shows that real beer prices were stable or declining during most of the time period, with the exception of upward adjustments during 1991-1992, which followed a federal excise tax hike that doubled the tax per barrel. Age 2002 Age , 2003a Age , 2003b . 
Advertising and Structural Change
Early industrial organization studies linked the disappearance of local and regional brewers to several factors, including transportation improvements, plant scale economies, packaging innovations, multi-plant economies, mergers, product positioning, and national advertising. Elzinga (1973 Elzinga ( , 1977 argued that the decline in numbers was principally due to the widening of geographic markets combined with economies of scale and technological change at the plant level. For example, rates of operation of can-closing lines increased significantly in the late-1960s. Keithahn (1978) , Lynk (1984) , McGahan (1991) , and Tremblay (1987) emphasized the same set of forces. Other factors, such as increased offpremise sales and exclusive distribution, also had adverse effects on local and regional brewers (Fogarty 1985) . Scherer et al. (1975) modified Elzinga's model to include the advantages of multi-plant operations, promotional scale economies, and the ability of leading firms to charge premium prices, thereby increasing the market area over which a given brewery could profitably ship its products. In Scherer's model, advertising helped establish a premium-brand image for the leading firms, and increased concentration allowed them to "squeeze the traditional premium-popular price differential" (Scherer et al. 1975, p. 249) .
In contrast, Greer (1971) attributed the decline in numbers almost solely to product differentiation and advertising rivalry ("competitive escalation of outlays"), rather than exogenouslydriven reductions in costs. Greer argued that advertising and higher levels of concentration were positively associated during the 1960s, due largely to increased television advertising. He suggested that as concentration continued to increase, advertising spending might stabilize around a lower industry-wide optimum. As shown above, real advertising did decline from 1985 to 1996. In a follow-up study, Greer (1981) disputed Scherer's price-squeeze model, and argued that "product differentiation explains why many firms big enough to exploit economies of scale in production nevertheless fail, and why many firms of suboptimum size survive prosperously" (Greer 1981, p. 96 ; emphasis added).
None of the above studies relied on regression analysis. Lynk (1984) , using state data for [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] , obtained a positive regression relationship between beer consumption and national concentration, suggesting that cost reductions were being passed on to consumers in the form of lower retail prices.
Tremblay (1985b) used firm-level data to analyze the net effects of concentration, advertising, and cost changes on wholesale beer prices during the period . Although the measured effect of concentration on prices was negative, Tremblay argued that escalating advertising prior to 1971 was sufficient to keep prices from falling. Lynk (1985) responded that the competitive issue was retail prices.
The structural debate has continued to the present day, although several new participants have entered the fray. Recent studies by Greer (1998 Greer ( , 2002 emphasize the combined advantages of multiplant operations and national television advertising. He argues that all mass-produced lager and light beers are essentially the same, regardless of price. According to Greer, the image-building efforts of the leading firms are the root cause of rising concentration and the decline of non-craft regional brewers.
3 Weinberg's explanation also reflects an industry rule-of-thumb that once a beer brand is in decline, it is virtually impossible to reverse that trend. Hence, the importance of advertising for brand loyalty. 4 Gallet and Euzent (2002) estimate an aggregate model of imperfect competition in the brewing industry that includes a conventional demand function and an Appelbaum-Bresnahan inverse supply function. The supply relationship for the real CPI price of beer includes: (1) marginal cost variables (wage rate, prices of barley and corn); (2) predicted level of demand; (3) negative demand shocks; (4) expected future industry profits; and (5) the industry advertising-sales ratio. The model is estimated using annual data for the period 1964-1992, during which the real price was falling. Gallet and Euzent find that the advertising levels did not significantly affect beer demand, but the advertising-sales ratio had a positive effect on the supply price. They interpret this finding to mean that increased advertising intensity resulted in decreased competition, and therefore higher market prices and lower consumption. However, Gisser's causality results do not support this interpretation. Scherer (1996, p. 414 ) adds first-mover advantages to his model, wherein product innovations are reinforced with advertising to determine the success of individual firms and market concentration. A similar story is advanced by Sutton (1991, pp. 285-303) , who argues that endogenous advertising outlays for differentiated products interact with scale economies to determine equilibrium market structures.
Elzinga (2001, p. 101) acknowledges that the decline of several once-prominent brewers is partly due to their lack of success in the light-beer segment of the market. None of these studies, however, has analyzed the recent rise in advertising that began around 1996 (Table 1) Overall, Gisser finds that the static deadweight loss to consumers from oligopoly pricing is small compared to the large dynamic gains from technological change and cost reductions. Advertising's role in this dynamic process is apparently confined to determining winners and losers, rather than altering competitive conditions generally. An updating of Gisser's study is a worthwhile research topic.
5 Ries and Ries (2002, p. 49) argue that no industry is as line-extended as the beer industry, and this has tended to erode ("cannibalize") the leaders' core brands without increasing firm sales or consumption per capita. Tremblay and Tremblay (1996) studied annual new product introductions by beer producers during the period 1950-1988. Industry-wide variables -concentration, advertising, and profits -had no significant effect on number of products, but a firm's past success and national status did affect the incentive to diversify. Historically, less successful and smaller firms were more likely to pioneer new products. During this period, the large national firms were not innovators. For example, light beer was introduced by Rheingold and Meister Brau in 1967 and 1968. 
IV. Beer Advertising and Strategic Rivalry
Given technological change, product innovations, and rivalistic pricing, many smaller brewers exited the industry after 1947. However, stability at the top level can be demonstrated for the leading brewers and brands, at least since 1990. More generally, all brewers do not advertise to the same extent or promote their individual brands on an equal basis or have equal costs of production. These differences within the industry have attracted the interest of industrial organization researchers. In this section, I first review some of the important product and brand changes since 1975, and then turn to a summary of past and present research on advertising and strategic rivalry.
Product Categories, Top Brands, and Advertising by Strategic Group
Beer is not a homogeneous product. Some important real differences exist by product type or quality, but there also are perceived differences due to advertising. Table 4 of total sales; and (2) popular beer and popular-light beer sales are 20% of total sales. These revised data suggest that the premium category (light plus non-light) has grown compared to 1975, whereas the popular-priced category has gone from 43% of the market to about 20%. Hence, the category trends in Table 4 reflect trading-up by consumers, with major sales losses incurred by the popular-priced category.
This category was once dominated by the regional and smaller national brewers, suggesting that advertising has affected consumers' choice of beer brands and categories, but not total consumption. Boston Brewing is an intensive advertiser. Further, the leading importers now advertise on a per case basis that equals or surpasses the industry leaders. 6 It would appear that once a brand takes off, higher rates of advertising inevitably follow, with exceptions found among the regional-specialty firms. 
Advertising and Strategic Rivalry
A number of studies have analyzed advertising rivalry among groups of brewers or rivalry at the brand level. Early studies were motivated by the Caves-Porter model of strategic groups and mobility barriers. Hatten et al. (1978) examined profitability as measured by yearly returns on book value of common equity for 13 brewers between 1952 and 1971. They regressed firm profitability on no less than 16 variables, including the number of brands, marketing expenditures at the firm level, and the industry advertising-sales ratio. Endogeneity tests were not conducted. Using Chow homogeneity tests, firms were grouped into six strategic groups. The number of brands was significantly negative for the two industry leaders -Anheuser and Schlitz -and significantly positive for a group of four regional brewers.
Marketing expenditures and industry advertising were never significant, although negative coefficients suggested that the leading firms might be sacrificing current profits for long-term growth. In a second study, Kelton and Kelton (1982) used a Markov model to examine the effects of advertising on market shares of Anheuser, Miller, and a group of six smaller brewers. Using data for 1971-1977, they concluded that brand-shift probabilities were sensitive to intraindustry advertising differentials, and
Miller's advertising during this time period was especially effective. In contrast, Baker and Bresnahan (1985, p. 435 ) found no effect of firm advertising on residual demand functions for Anheuser-Busch, Pabst, and Coors.
A fourth analysis was conducted by Tremblay (1985a) . The sample consisted of annual firm data for the three leading national brewers -Anheuser, Pabst, and Schlitz -and nineteen regional brewers for the period 1950-77. Using pooled data, Tremblay regressed real average revenue per barrel (price) for each firm on own-and cross-output (in barrels), real own-and cross-advertising, quantity of imported beer, group dummies, and other non-strategic variables (population of 20-44 year olds, per capita income). He found a positive own-advertising effect for the leading producers; a negative crossadvertising effect by national rivals; and a small, but positive, cross-advertising effect by the regional rivals. The interpretation of the latter result is unclear since it could reflect trading-up to premium brands or, as suggested by Tremblay, a positive spillover effect of regionals' advertising on the leaders' average revenues. Nevertheless, the net effect of advertising is dominated by the positive own-advertising effect.
Tremblay concluded that advertising and production rivalry was more rigorous inside a strategic group as significant differences existed in the demand and cost conditions among national and regional brewers.
Three recent studies failed to provide much insight into the changes in rivalry since 1975.
Wilcox ( Miller. Chintagunta and Jain (1995) estimate a different closed-loop duopoly specification, which accounts for the effect of own-advertising on the rival's market share and the effect of own-share on the rival's share. Using data for [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] and lagged values of advertising as instruments, they find roughly equal impacts of own-advertising on the shares of Anheuser and Miller. Hence, the two gametheoretic studies provide conflicting results for roughly the same time period.
7 Future researchers might consult studies of cigarette advertising rivalry, such as Brown (1978) , Roberts and Samuelson (1988) , Seldon and Doroodian (1990) , and Thomas (1989) . 8 According to the Monitoring the Future survey, 30-day prevalence of alcohol use by twelfth graders declined from 72% in 1980 to 47.5% in 2003; data available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/. It is interesting, in light of the negative trend, that there should be rising social concern about youth drinking. For a rentseeking model that might shed some light on this regulation, see McChesney (1987 McChesney ( , 1997 .
In a comprehensive study, Tremblay and Tremblay (1995) While this result might reflect the shift away from popular-priced beer, Tremblay and Tremblay conclude that higher advertising results in higher real average revenues (prices). Their conclusion contrasts with the evidence that the real beer price index has been stable or declining since 1963, but the partial relationship can be positive. Moreover, the welfare results in Tremblay and Tremblay conflict with those in Gisser (1999) . Both studies ignore the important shifts among product categories. Additional research is needed to sort out the welfare effects of technological change, product category innovations, consumer preferences, increased concentration, and beer advertising levels or intensities.
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V. Beer Advertising and Social Costs
Beverage alcohol has been implicated in a number of social ills, including traffic fatalities, crime, violence, suicide, educational failure, productivity losses, and other intoxicating or addictive problems.
Underage alcohol use is a particular concern and, in fiscal 2000, $71 million was allocated to prevent underage alcohol use through programs run by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, and Transportation ( GAO 2001) . 8 Several attempts have been made to estimate the total external costs of alcohol abuse, but it is common for these estimates to overstate costs by including private costs (Heien 1995; Sindelar 1998) . For example, lost productivity is largely a private cost. Various publicinterest groups, such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest (1995), have singled-out advertising as a major contributor to alcohol problems. The continuing nature of this concern is reflected in reports by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC 1985 (FTC , 1999 (FTC , 2003a , Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse NIAAA 1995 NIAAA , 2000 . Proposals to ban all alcohol 9 The main areas of state regulation are: (1) labeling and container sizes; (2) advertising regulations on billboards, print, broadcast, circulars, price premiums in ads, and sample distribution; (3) novelties, retail display, and window-interior display regulations; (4) credit regulations; (5) container deposits and other container-use regulations; (6) litter assessments; (7) permissible alcohol content; (8) state excise tax rates; (9) shipping requirements; and (10) brewer-wholesaler regulations (exclusive territories, filing requirements). Summaries of the applicable state laws for beer are found in several publications, including the Modern Brewery Age Bluebook. (4) recent challenges to the three-tier system of alcohol distribution and the Twenty-First Amendment.
Space prevents coverage of all social cost issues, but the reader can consult surveys by Moore (2000, 2002) , National Research Council (2004), Nelson ( , 2004a , and NIAAA (2000) .
In the United States, the distribution of alcohol beverages is regulated by the individual states.
The Twenty-First Amendment, passed in 1933, repealed Prohibition and granted legal powers over the distribution and sale of alcohol to the states, thereby resolving the conflicts among "wet" and "dry"
interests (Miron 1998; Munger and Schaller 1997; Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee 2000) . As a result, alcohol laws vary importantly by state, and these differences represent a natural experiment with regard to the economic effects of regulation.
9 Until recently, the assumption was that states' rights under the Twenty-First Amendment extended to restrictions or bans of alcohol advertising. Several court decisions since 1980 have modified this authority. State laws also differ by beverage, suggesting that substitution among beverages is one possible consequence of regulation. For example, state laws for distilled spirits typically are more stringent than similar laws applied to beer and wine. While each state has adopted its own unique regulatory system, several broad categories can be identified for analysis. Following repeal, eighteen states adopted public monopoly control of the distribution of distilled spirits, with the remaining states issuing private licenses. Thirteen of the monopoly states presently operate retail stores for the sale of spirits, and two states also control retail sales of table wine (Pennsylvania, Utah). In five monopoly states, only the wholesale distribution of distilled spirits is controlled. Monopoly control increases search costs by restricting outlet numbers, hours of operation, product variety, and advertising. Because beer and wine can be substitutes or complements for spirits, state monopoly control of spirits can increase or decrease total alcohol use, or the net effect might be zero (see Benson et al. 2003; Nelson 10 Two federal agencies also have authority over alcohol advertising, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). The TTB's authority is derived from the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935, which prohibits false, misleading, obscene, and indecent statements in advertising. TTB's beer advertising regulations apply at the state-level if the state has adopted the provisions of the FAA Act. TTB also regulates alcohol labeling. Over the years, TTB has been involved with controversies regarding health warnings labels; health-related claims, including calorie and carbohydrate content; ingredients listing; and alcohol content labeling. TTB has recently proposed rules for classification of flavored malt beverages; see 68 Federal Register 14291 (March 24, 2003) . 1990, 2003) . No state has monopolized beer sales, but laws in several states provide for restrictions on private beer sales by alcohol content.
A second broad experiment includes state regulations banning advertising of alcohol beverages or which restrict the advertising of prices.
10 Following repeal, fourteen states banned billboard advertising of distilled spirits, including seven of the private license states. Several of these states also banned billboard advertising of beer and wine. Because the bans have been in existence for many years and change infrequently over time, these regulations provide evidence on the long-term effectiveness of advertising bans. For example, it is often argued that billboards have an important effect on youth behaviors, and this belief has been a basis for municipal ordinances that ban billboard advertising of alcohol and tobacco. Given long-standing bans, it can be expected that youth alcohol behavior will show up as cross-state differences in adult per capita consumption. Indeed, these two variables are highly correlated (Cook and Moore 2001) . Further, fifteen states banned price advertising by retailers using billboards, newspapers, or visible store displays. In general, a ban of price advertising reduces retail competition and increases search costs of consumers. However, these regulations were not intended to advance temperance, but were anti-competitive measures obtained by alcohol retailers and wholesalers (McGahan 1995) . For example, in 44 Liquormart (1996) the appeals court noted that Rhode Island's ban of price advertising was designed to protect smaller retailers from in-state and out-of-state competition, and was closely monitored by the liquor retailers association. The aftereffects of the 44 Liquormart decision on alcohol prices in Rhode Island are analyzed by Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) .
Supreme Court Decisions: Central Hudson and 44 Liquormart
For many years, the Supreme Court held that the broad powers of government to regulate commerce included the "lesser power" to restrict commercial speech. In Valentine (1942) [and] to this end, the free flow of information is indispensable" (425 U.S. 748, at 765). In Central Hudson Gas & Electric (1980) , the Court refined its approach and laid out a four-prong test for scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech. First, the message content cannot be misleading and must be concerned with a lawful activity or product. Second, the government's interest in regulating the speech in question must be substantial.
Third, the regulation must directly and materially advance that interest. Fourth, the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its goal; that is, there must be a "reasonable fit" between means and ends, with the means narrowly tailored to achieve the objective.
Applying the third and fourth-prongs, the Court in 44 Liquormart (1996) struck down a Rhode Island law that banned retail price advertising of beverage alcohol. In doing so, the Court made it clear that a state's power to ban alcohol entirely under the Twenty-First Amendment did not include the "lesser power" to restrict advertising. 44 Liquormart was the most recent in a long series of Court decisions that weakened the states' ability to use their regulatory powers in an anti-competitive manner (Denning 2002) . Prior to 1980, the common understanding was that the Twenty-First Amendment gave the states absolute power to regulate beverage alcohol, despite interference with other federal laws.
However, in Midcal Aluminum (1980), the Supreme Court struck down California's price posting law as a violation of the Sherman Act. In Bacchus Imports (1984) , the Court decided that Hawaii's tax scheme favoring in-state alcohol producers violated the Commerce Clause. In Brown-Forman (1986) , the Court determined that New York's concurrent price affirmation law violated the Commerce Clause. These cases establish that in order to survive a constitutional challenge, a state's alcohol laws must be realistically designed to promote temperance and not mere economic protectionism (Foust 2000) .
11
In summary, Central Hudson requires a "balancing-of-interests" test to examine censorship of commercial speech. The test weighs the government's obligations toward freedom of expression with its interest in limiting the content of some advertisements. Reasonable constraints on time, place, and manner are tolerated, and false or deceptive advertising remains illegal. Faced with this constraint, local 12 In Pitt News (2004), the appeals court for the third circuit struck down Act 199, a Pennsylvania law passed in 1996 that banned advertisers from paying for the dissemination of alcohol beverage advertising by any communications media affiliated with a university, college, or other educational institution (i.e., student newspapers). The state argued that newspapers could run free advertisements, but failed to provide evidence that the law would be effective in limiting underage drinking. Applying the third and fourth prongs, the court ruled that Act 199 was an impermissible restriction of commercial speech. The court noted that state regulations dealing with alcohol are subject to the same First Amendment restrictions that apply to the federal government. The court also ruled that the law was presumptively unconstitutional because it targeted a narrow segment of the media, and thereby imposed a financial burden on a particular media. (The author testified at the initial hearing in this case.) 13 Advertising in the macro-economy is pro-cyclical, which is contrary to the Galbraith's claim that major corporations use advertising to manage or control aggregate demand; see the series of articles on advertising during the recession appearing in the Wall Street Journal (2001a , 2001b , 2001c .
governments have attempted to design alcohol and tobacco advertising ordinances that might survive a Central Hudson test. Typically, the justification advanced for the ordinance is a desire to protect youth and young adults by restricting exposure to billboard advertising. The legality of these ordinances is uncertain. In May of 1996, the Supreme Court remanded Schmoke (1996) , which let stand a ban on outdoor advertising of alcohol in Baltimore City. The City contended that advertising increased alcohol consumption, but no evidence was presented to support this claim. However, in 2001, the Court in Lorillard (2001) struck down a Massachusetts ban on advertising of cigarettes, holding that the ban was more restrictive than necessary and pre-empted by federal law. The ruling in Lorillard suggests that only very narrowly proscribed advertising ordinances can survive a Central Hudson test. . Second, if an industry-level response function exists, consumption levels should be subject to diminishing marginal returns from advertising, but it is unclear where diminishing returns begin (the inflection point) or the magnitude of this effect. Some analysts argue that diminishing returns begin at high levels of industry advertising, and sharply increasing returns exist at lower levels (Saffer 1993) . According to this view, comprehensive bans of alcohol advertising will reduce market demand. This argument is at odds with the evidence for a variety of products, including alcohol (Assmus et al. 1984; Nelson 2003b; Simon and Arndt 1980; Tellis 2004) . 13 Several empirical approaches can be used to assess the nature of the response function. First, traditional demand functions incorporating advertising expenditures have been estimated using timeseries data for different time periods, beverages, and countries. For example, a study of annual U.S. beer demand by Lee and Tremblay (1992, p. 74) found "no support for the hypothesis that advertising has a significant effect on market demand" for the period . Second, recent studies have used cointegration methods to estimate long-run demand relationships. Coulson et al. (2001) studied U.S. beer, wine, and spirits consumption and advertising using quarterly data for . None of the long-run own-and cross-advertising elasticities for beer were statistically significant, but demographics played an important role. Short-run dynamics were estimated using an error correction model, which yielded little in the way of an adjustment process. Overall, the results support the view that the primary effect of advertising is to redistribute brand shares, with little inter-beverage effects. Cointegration and unit root tests have been applied to alcohol advertising in other countries with similar results, including studies for Canada (Larivière et al. 2001) , Italy (Cavaliere and Tassinari 2001) , and the United Kingdom (Abbott et al. 1997; Blake and Nied 1997; Duffy 2003) .
A third approach has been to incorporate advertising bans into demand functions based on pooled state data. A recent study by Nelson (2003a) 1982-1988 and 1989-1997 . A number of explanatory variables were considered, including prices, income, tourism, demographics, and the legal drinking age. During both time periods, state billboard bans increased consumption of wine and spirits and reduced consumption of beer. The net effect on total ethanol consumption was significantly positive during 1982-1988, and insignificant thereafter. During both time periods, bans of price advertising of spirits were associated with lower consumption of spirits, higher consumption of beer, and no effect on wine or total alcohol consumption. The results indicate that advertising regulations have different effects by beverage, but the empirical evidence in Nelson (2003a) and earlier studies demonstrate that state bans of billboards have had little or no effect on temperance.
Lastly, four studies used cross-national panel data on alcohol consumption and advertising bans: Nelson and Young (2001) ; Saffer (1991) ; Saffer and Dave (2002) ; and Young (1993) . Because alcohol behavior or "cultural sentiment" varies by country, it is important that the social setting is considered. In particular, the level of alcohol consumption in the wine-drinking countries is substantially greater than in other countries: France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain have consumption levels that are about one-third greater than average. Further, 20 to 25% of consumption in the Scandinavian countries is systematically under-reported due to cross-border purchases, smuggling, and home production. In contrast to earlier studies, Nelson and Young (2001) accounted for these differences. The study examined alcohol demand and related adverse behaviors in a sample of 17 OECD countries (western Europe, Canada, U.S.) for the period 1977 to 1995. Control variables included prices, income, tourism, demographics, unemployment, and drinking sentiment. The results indicate that bans of broadcast advertising of spirits did not decrease per capita alcohol consumption or affect other adverse outcome (traffic fatalities, cirrhosis mortality). During the sample period, five countries adopted broadcast bans of all alcohol advertisements, apart from low-alcohol beer (Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden).
The regression estimates for complete bans were insignificantly positive. For the U.S., the cross-country results are consistent with studies of successful brands, studies of advertising expenditures, and studies of billboard bans. The results in Nelson and Young are inconsistent with an industry advertising-response function with a well-defined inflection point.
Targeting of Adolescents in Magazine Advertisements
Two recent studies claim to demonstrate that alcohol producers are targeting youth through placements of advertisements in magazines. These studies have severe scientific limitations. A study by the Center for Alcohol Marketing and Youth (CAMY 2002a, p. 1) claims to show that "marketers of beer and distilled spirits delivered more advertising to youth than to adults in magazines in 2001." The problem with this claim is that CAMY used gross rating points to judge the relative amount of advertising reaching different age groups of readers (FTC 2003a) . Gross rating points (GRPs) are the product of an advertisement's reach within a given population group (% of a target population) and frequency (average number of exposures per time period). GRPs ignore the total audience or readership of a magazine, which can be overwhelmingly composed of adults. The correct exposure measure is an advertisement's total impressions, which is the product of the target population and the GRP. Measured by total impressions, adult readers are the primary group being reached by advertisements in major magazines, which is easily confirmed by the CAMY data (see FTC 2003a).
A second study by Garfield et al. (2003) (ages 12-19) . Their Poisson regression model controlled for the number of readers in two other age groups (young adults, older adults) and readership demographics (number of readers by gender, race, and income-level). However, there are at least two empirical problems with this study.
First, the explanatory variables do not vary over time, whereas the dependent variable -log of annual number of alcohol advertisements -does vary with time. Consequently, the variables for readership cohorts can only explain cross-sectional variation, and a set of year dummies explains all of the temporal variation. This is a very restrictive specification, which does not withstand attempts at replication using the cross-sectional variation. Second, the study suffers from severe collinerarity problems due to use of number of readers in several cohorts, which simply reflect the total readership of a magazine. Major magazines, such as Sports Illustrated, have large numbers of youth, young adult, and adult readers.
In Nelson (2004b) , I used cross-sectional data for number of youth readers (12-19 years); number of young adult readers (20-24 years); number of adult readers (25+ years); number of male readers; number of black readers; and number of low-income readers. Advertising exposure was measured by the five-year totals for beer advertising placements; wine advertising placements; and spirits advertising placements. Additional explanatory variables introduced in my study were the number of issues per year (weekly or monthly), median reader income, and median reader age for adults. The last two variables serve to reduce the collinearity problem. Following Garfield et al. (2003) , the dependent variables are specified as the logarithms of the total number of beer, spirits, or wine magazine ads, but measured in my study for the five-year period 1997-2001. Again following Garfield et al., a value of one is added to each coefficient estimate, except for the constant term. As a result, the reported coefficients represent "advertising rate ratios" (ARR), which is the proportional change in placements for a unit change in an explanatory variable. An AAR that is greater than one indicates that advertisers tend to favor magazines with that readership characteristic. Table 7 summarizes my empirical results. The results fail to demonstrate that targeting of youth is occurring. Regressions (1), (4), and (7) replicate the specifications in Garfield et al. (2003) , but the coefficients for youth readership are not statistically significant for beer or spirits. Six of nine coefficient estimates for youth are less than one in magnitude, including the significant coefficient for wine. The alternative demographic for adult readers -median reader age -is statistically significant in four of the six regressions. Further, median reader income is significant in two of three regressions. The results demonstrate that beer and spirits advertisers tend to favor magazines with greater numbers of young adults, men, and black readers, but not adolescents. Wine advertisers favor magazines with older adults and higher-income readers, but not adolescents. The specifications that use median income and median age of readers provide a better fit for beer. Median age is significantly positive for beer and spirits, while median income is significantly positive for wine.
Overall, the results fail to support the hypothesis that alcohol marketers, including beer producers, are 14 In February of 2004, Costco filed a lawsuit in federal district court charging that Washington state's three-tier distribution system, which prohibits volume discounts, raises beer and wine prices to consumers. According to Modern Brewery Age (2000b Age ( , 2000c , some national and regional accounts used by major brewers require distributors to deliver products at given prices, which is a form of direct distribution by resale price maintenance. Wholesalers are paid an agent fee in the form of rebates, allowances, or volume discounts.
targeting youth by placement of advertisements in magazines. These relationships deserve additional investigation by marketing specialists and economists.
4. The Three-Tier System, Internet Marketing, and Direct Shipments of Beer and Wine Under the so-called three-tier system of alcohol distribution, a licensed producer of alcohol sells to a licensed wholesaler and the wholesaler in turn sells to licensed retailers. This system prohibits vertical integration between the tiers, and was intended to give the states complete control over alcohol sales within their borders by preventing, among other things, "tied house" saloons. It also creates powerful economic interests that have a stake in continued operation of a balkanized system of distribution. This is especially true for larger wholesalers.
14 For example, it is difficult for smaller brewers to compete on an equal cost basis due to the economies associated with mass distribution. The development of "local brewers" in the form of microbreweries and brewpubs is one response to the limits imposed by the three-tier system, but their overall competitive impact has been small. Even so, beer wholesalers in some states (e.g., Colorado) have tried to restrict the annual output of beerpubs. An even greater threat to the current system is direct shipments to mass retailers, such as Costco and Wal-Mart, which might eventually force deregulation. (Wiseman and Ellig 2004) . First, the "dormant" Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism that favors in-state interests and thus limits how that states can regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment. Second, state direct-shipment bans might violate the Constitution's "Privileges and Immunities Clause" because the bans impose burdens on specific livelihoods. 16 Appearing on the FTC panel on wine was Nobel Laureate economist (and vintner), Daniel L. McFadden; see http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/mcfadden.pdf. He argued that direct shipments will have little impact on the structure of the wine industry, but major positive benefits for wine consumers.
passed an on-site law that allows limited direct shipments if an order is placed in person at a winery, but which also makes it more difficult to bring wine home on airplanes. Because several states have exempted in-state wineries from direct shipments or have other discriminatory provisions, there are at least eight lawsuits filed in federal courts that challenge the constitutionality of these laws. In May 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to consolidate the cases in Michigan and New York, and will resolve the constitutional conflicts with the Twenty-First Amendment.
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The political economy of state direct shipment laws is analyzed by Newkirk and Atkinson (2003) and Riekhof and Sykuta (2004) . Additional analysis of this issue is found in several law journal articles (Denning 2002; Douglass 2000; Foust 2000; Martin 2000 Martin , 2001 Shanker 1999) ; a House hearing on Ecommerce (U.S. Congress 2002); and an FTC staff report (2003b) . 16 Using results from Wiseman and Ellig (2003) , the FTC concluded that direct shipments could lower some wine prices by 10-20 percent and would enhance the variety of wines available to consumers. An FTC survey of states that allow direct shipments reported few or no problems with shipments to underage minors (FTC 2003b) . The implications of direct shipments for the beer industry would appear to be modest, although a number of on-line beer clubs exist. More generally, the possibility exists that mass retailers will use their buying power to make major changes in the ways in which beer is distributed to consumers. The changing nature of the states' three-tier systems and related regulatory issues is a topic that deserves to be closely followed by industrial organization economists.
VI. Conclusions
Future studies of beer advertising should focus on policy relevant issues, such as the relationship of advertising to market concentration, mergers, collusion, predation, entry, and social costs. Given the high level of industry concentration, these issues will continue to be the subject of policy debates. With regard to social costs, this update has identified several issues that deserve additional research. In particular, I have noted the lack of support for an industry-wide advertising response function; the lack of convincing evidence for targeting of adolescents by alcohol advertisers; and the changing nature of the three-tier system of distribution. Additional economic research on these topics is desirable. 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2003 (1994 and 2004) . Barton Beers and Gambrinus Co. are joint importers of Corona Extra and other Groupo Modelo brands, and distributors of other imported and domestic beers. Garfield et al. (2003) , the dependent variables are natural logs of the total number of advertisements for years 1997-2000, with zero observations excluded. Poisson estimates obtained using Stata 8.0. Z-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors; asterisk indicates statistically significant coefficient at the 95% level, two-tailed test. All regressions are statistically significant based on a Wald chi-square test. All coefficients, except the constant term, have been scaled by adding a value of one and adjusting the standard errors. Median income is in thousands of U.S. dollars. MSE is the residual mean squared error. J-B (p) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera test statistic for the null hypothesis that the residuals are normal.
